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OPINION OF COURT OF APPEALS 
A copy of the Memorandum Decision of the Court of Appeals is attached to the 
Addendum at Tab 1. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this matter under the provisions of 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(a) and Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in its construction and application of 
relevant precedent to Petitioner's claim for severance damages for loss of view. 
Standard of Review: The interpretation and construction of relevant precedent is 
reviewed on appeal for correctness. See Wardley Better Homes and Gardens v. Cannon, 
2002 UT 99, | 12, 61 P.3d 1009 ("We review the court of appeals' decision for 
correctness, and give its conclusions of law no deference."); Bear den v. Croft, 2001 UT 
76, 1J 5, 31 P.3d 537 ("Correctness is also the standard for review of questions of statutory 
interpretation."); State v. Montoya, 887 P.2d 857 (Utah 1994) ("A court of appeals' 
interpretation of the effect of a prior judicial decision, whether one of its own or one of 
another court, constitutes a conclusion of law to which we accord no particular deference. 
Review is for correctness."). 
2. Whether damages for loss of view may be segregated from overall 
severance damages. 
1 
Standard of Review: The Utah Supreme Court reviews the decision of the Court 
of Appeals for correctness, giving its conclusions of law no deference. See Bear River 
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wall, 1999 UT 33, % 5, 978 P.2d 460 ("On certiorari, we review the 
decision of the court of appeals, not the decision of the trial court. We review the court 
of appeals' decision for correctness and give its conclusions of law no deference.") 
(internal citations omitted). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES 
Utah Constitution, Article 1, § 22. 
§ 78B-6-511(2), Utah Code Annotated. 
Rule 45, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedures. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellee Utah Department of Transportation O'UDOT") filed its Complaint in this 
case (Case No. 970905361) on July 31, 1997, seeking to condemn a portion of property 
(the "Mark Property") then owned by Mark Investment Company for purposes of the 1-15 
reconstruction project. (R. 11-20.) 
Prior to the reconstruction of 1-15, both the north and south bound travel lanes 
were at about the same elevation as the Admiral and Mark Properties. This afforded 
Admiral an open view to the east from Ensign Peak on the north to Mount Timpanogos 
on the south. As a part of the 1-15 reconstruction, the travel lanes were elevated to a 
height of some 27 feet thereby obstructing any view to the east from the remainder and 
leaving the remainder property in a virtual hole. (R. 181, 494-95.) 
o 
The Mark Property was purchased by Admiral on July 22, 1998 (R. 172), based 
upon fair market value appraisal of both the Mark Property and the adjoining Admiral 
Property, dated November 25, 1994, prepared by Jerry R. Webber, MAI. (R. 773-74.) 
On August 1, 1997, UDOT filed its Complaint in Case No. 970905368 seeking to 
condemn a portion of the neighboring piece of property (the "Admiral Property"), which 
was owned by Admiral, also for purposes of the 1-15 reconstruction project. (R. 1-10.) 
The Admiral Property was purchased by Admiral on April 20, 2001 (R. 172-73), 
based upon a second fair market value appraisal prepared by Jerry R. Webber, dated 
October 17, 1996. (R. 773-74.) Jerry Webber also prepared a third fair market value 
appraisal of both the Mark Property and the Admiral Property dated September 7, 2007, 
as Admiral's expert witness in this case. Id. Admiral subsequently purchased the Mark 
property from Mark Investment Company. As a result, on July 14, 1999, the trial court 
entered an order consolidating Case No. 970905368 into this case, Case No. 970905361. 
(R. 63-64.) 
In early 2005, the parties filed cross motions in limine regarding the type of 
evidence that would be admissible to prove Admiral's severance damages. (R. 151-163, 
168-189.) Following oral argument, on October 31, 2005, Judge Stephen L. Roth entered 
a Memorandum Decision and Order, wherein he granted UDOT's motion in limine and 
denied Admiral's cross motion in limine ("Judge Roth's Order"). (Addendum Tab 2) (R. 
492-502.) The effect to Judge Roth's Order, dated October 31, 2005, was to eliminate all 
of Admiral's claims for severance damages. (R. 500-501.) 
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However, Judge Roth noted the patent unfairness to Admiral of his ruling in a 
footnote at page 10 of his decision: 
The facts of this case illustrate the sometimes arbitrary nature of the rule 
that the court has relied on in making its decision here. Without so finding, 
it is certainly possible that the court's decision would have been 
significantly different if the offending elevated freeway ramp had been built 
six inches within, rather than six inches outside, the condemned parcel 109. 
In this regard Admiral has advanced an argument that has special appeal 
given the harsh result the difference of a matter of inches may produce. 
That argument proposes that if a taking is part of an integrated project 
(which Admiral argues is the case here), the landowner should be entitled 
to compensation for damages resulting from specific improvements related 
to the purpose of the taking and causing specific injury to the remainder, 
even if they were not constructed within the immediate boundaries of the 
take. See Admiral Beverage Corporation's Reply Memorandum in Support 
of Its Motion in Limine . . ., at 6-10. This approach recognizes that the 
actual reduction in value of the remainder from the improvement, as a 
practical matter, may be no different when it is located just within or just 
outside of the taken parcel. 
The court believes, however, that the repeated (and apparently unequivocal) 
holdings of the Utah Supreme Court, as addressed above, constrain it from 
seriously considering such an approach at this level, because it would 
involve a departure from current law. In this regard, the appellate courts 
are better equipped to identify, analyze and resolve the competing public 
and private interests, as well as the legal complications, that would be 
implicated in such a change in approach to severance damages. The 
resolution of these issues must therefore be left to some future appeal. 
(Addendum Tab 2) (R. at 501.) 
Because Judge Roth's Order involved unique legal issues of first impression in 
Utah, as noted above, he subsequently certified his ruling for appeal under Rule 54(b) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (R. 522-23.) However, on August 10, 2006, the Utah 
Court of Appeals dismissed Admiral's appeal without prejudice stating that Judge Roth's 
Order was "not an order eligible for certification under Rule 54(b)." (R. 556-59.) 
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Following the dismissal of Admiral's appeal, the case was assigned to the Honorable 
Robert P. Faust. 
In February 2007, the Utah Supreme Court handed down its decision in Ivers v. 
Utah Dept. of Tramp., 2007 UT 19, 154 P.3d 802, which dealt with a factual setting 
virtually identical to the facts of the present case, as is explained infra. 
In mid to late 2007, UDOT filed a series of additional motions in limine seeking to 
exclude evidence at trial relating to, among other things, Admiral's severance damages 
caused by the loss of view and visibility. (R. 656-64, 733-35, 780-82.) On December 27, 
2007, the trial court entered a Minute Entry, wherein it granted UDOT's motions in 
limine (the "Minute Entry"). (Addendum Tab 3) (R. 862-64.) The practical effect of the 
trial court's Minute Entry was that it again disposed of Admiral's claims for severance 
damages. See id. 
Although the Ivers case was referred to and quoted in Admiral's brief in the trial 
court, Judge Faust's Minute Entry dated December 27, 2007, does not even refer to the 
Ivers decision, which was handed down ten months earlier. Rather, Judge Faust's Minute 
Entry simply "refers the parties to Judge Roth's earlier decision and adopts the same 
here." (R. 866.) 
On January 10, 2008, Admiral petitioned for permission to pursue an interlocutory 
appeal from Judge Faust's Minute Entry. (R. 872-74.) On January 30, 2008, the Utah 
Court of Appeals issued its order granting Admiral permission to pursue an interlocutory 
appeal on the following issue: "Whether the trial court erred in excluding evidence of 
severance damages based on loss of view from the remaining property." (R. 895.) 
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On November 28, 2008, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the District 
Court. (Addendum Tab 1.) 
In its Memorandum Decision, the Utah Court of Appeals noted, as Judge Roth 
had, the harshness as to Admiral of its ruling: 
We acknowledge that application of the abutment rale in this case may 
seem harsh, given that Admiral's proximity to the now-elevated 1-15 is very 
close and that its property abuts land taken for the overall project. Still, the 
ease of application and the predictability engendered by a bright-line rule 
are of such obvious benefit in this area of the law that if the abutment rule 
is to be moderated, it must come at the direction of our Supreme Court 
rather than of this court. 
(Addendum Tab 1.) 
On January 8, 2009, Admiral filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari. That Petition 
was granted by the Utah Supreme Court on April 17, 2009. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The decision of the Court of Appeals, which excludes evidence of severance 
damages based upon loss of view from Admiral's remaining property, is flawed for 
multiple reasons. First, the ruling conflicts with Article 1, Section 22 of the Utah 
Constitution. Second, the ruling conflicts with this Court's decision in Ivers v. Utah 
Dept ofTransp., 2007 UT 19, 154 P.3d 802. Third, the Court of Appeals' decision to 
exclude evidence of severance damages based on loss of view will allow UDOT to reap a 
windfall at Admiral's expense. Finally, it is impossible for Admiral to segregate its loss 
of view damages from its overall severance damage amount. Accordingly, the Court 
should reverse the Court of Appeals' November 28, 2008 Memorandum Decision and 
remand this matter for further proceedings. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
The trial court's decision, affirmed by the Utah Court of Appeals, to 
exclude evidence of severance damage from loss of view, conflicts with 
Article 1, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution. 
Both Amendment V of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 22 of 
the Utah Constitution prohibit the taking of private property without just compensation. 
In carrying out these constitutional mandates, Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-511 
provides that in a condemnation action the court, jury or referee must ascertain and 
assess: 
(l)(a) the value of the property sought to be condemned and all 
improvements pertaining to the realty; 
* * # 
(c) if it consists of different parcels, the value of each parcel and of 
each estate or interest in each shall be separately assessed; 
(2) if the property sought to be condemned constitutes only a part of 
a larger parcel, the damages which will accrue to the portion not sought to 
be condemned by reason of its severance from the portion sought to be 
condemned and the construction of the improvement in the manner 
proposed by the plaintiff; 
The compensation to which an owner is entitled for "severance damage" to the remainder 
under subsection (2) is the difference in the fair market value of the owner's remaining 
property before and after the taking. See, e.g., State v. Cooperative Sec. Corp. of Church 
of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 247 P.2d 269, 271 (Utah 1952); Carpet Bam v. 
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State, 786 P.2d 770, 772-73 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).1 Such a determination can only be 
made by considering all of the relevant facts and circumstances that affect market value: 
In making the [severance damage] appraisal, it is not only permissible, but 
necessary to consider all of the facts and circumstances that a prudent and 
willing buyer and seller, with knowledge of the facts, would take into 
account in arriving at market value. 
J.D. Eaton, Real Estate Valuation in Litigation, 316 (1995) (quoting State Road Com 'n v. 
Rohan, 487 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1971)). The effect of the taking on fair market value, 
therefore, should be the focal point of the assessment of severance damages to the 
remainder in the present case. 
As stated in Bagfordv. Ephraim City, 904 P.2d 1095, 1098 (Utah 1995): 
[u]nder general principles of eminent domain, property is not limited to 
land or improvements thereon, id., but "[e]very species of property which 
the public needs may require . . . (including) legal and equitable rights of 
every description . , . liable to be appropriated." 
Id. (citation omitted). Moreover, this Court has clearly set the rules by which just 
compensation for such a taking should be determined: 
For compensation to be fair and just it must reflect fair value of the land to 
the landowner. Just compensation means the owners must be put in as 
good a position money wise as they would have occupied had their property 
not been taken. 
Utah State Road Commission v. Friberg, 687 P.2d 821, 828 (Utah 1984). Just 
compensation is the difference in fair market value of the owner's property before and 
after the taking. See Utah Dept. ofTransp. v. Ray Co. Corp., 599 P.2d 481 (Utah 1979). 
1
 Utah courts have long utilized the market value of property as the yardstick for 
determining recovery in eminent domain cases. See, e.g., Southern Pacific Co. v. Arthur, 
352 P.2d 693, 695 (Utah 1960). 
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Despite the fact that no exception is made in these constitutional mandates or in 
Utah law for special treatment of UDOT in condemnation cases, UDOT has repeatedly 
asked Utah courts to sanction violations by it of the "just compensation" requirement and 
permit it to take valuable property rights without payment of compensation. This is so 
despite the fact that no other condemning authority, including the United States, is given 
that right. 
Utah cases which have permitted the taking of privately held rights without 
payment of compensation make no effort to reconcile the undeniable inconsistency and 
conflict of such takings with the above quoted constitutional, statutory or case law. No 
justification is given for the unfair and forced transfer to UDOT of substantial property 
rights without payment of any compensation, let alone just compensation. 
This case presents a stark example of the inconsistency and unfairness of the 
UDOT's position. Each of the parcels taken had been purchased by Admiral based upon 
appraised fair market value. It is undisputed that substantial severance damages resulted 
from the taking. However, the trial court and the Court of Appeals approved, with some 
reluctance, UDOT's request that it be exempt from the obligation all other condemning 
authorities have to meet, and provide just compensation for the property rights taken from 
Admiral. At the time Admiral purchased each of the two parcels, it could not have 
known or expected that UDOT would take a significant portion of the value Admiral 
purchased without having to pay anything for that value. 
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POINT II 
The trial court's decision, affirmed by the Utah Court of Appeals, to 
exclude evidence of severance damages based on loss of view conflicts 
with the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Ivers v. Utah Dept. of 
Tramp., 2007 UT 19,154 P.3d 802 . 
In February of 2007, the Utah Supreme Court issued its decision in Ivers v. Utah 
Dept. of Tramp., 2007 UT 19, 154 P.3d 802, essentially rewriting important rules 
regarding severance damages relating to loss of view and visibility. The Utah Supreme 
Court declared that "existing Utah law does recognize an easement of view from one's 
property as a protectable property right." Id. at f^ 16. The trial court's Minute Entry in 
this case, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, fails to address, and in important respects is 
directly contrary to, the Ivers decision. 
In Ivers. just like the present case, UDOT argued that the landowner was not 
entitled to any damages for loss of view because "[n]o portion of the raised highway, its 
footings, or its foundation was constructed on the condemned land; rather, the 
condemned land was used for the creation of the frontage road and for improvements to 
Shephard Lane." Id. at ^ 3. Despite this fact, the court in Ivers ruled that loss of view 
severance damages are appropriate "when the view-impairing structure is built on land 
other than the condemned land, but the condemned land is used as part of a single project 
and that use is essential to completion of the project." Id. at j^ 26. 
It would be difficult to find a case more on point with the present case than Ivers. 
In that case: 
10 
[T]he State condemned a 0.048-acre portion of Arby's 0.416-acre lot in 
order to build a one-way frontage road parallel to, and connecting with, the 
newly widened and elevated highway. 
* * * 
No portion of the raised highway, its footings, or its foundation was 
constructed on the condemned land; rather, the condemned land was used 
for the creation of the frontage road and for improvements to Shephard 
Lane. 
* * * 
The elevation of the highway has obstructed both the view to the east from 
Arby's land and the visibility of Arby's property from the highway. 
* * * 
[T]he pursuant loss of view and visibility, diminished the market value of 
the remaining land. 
Id. at Yl 2-5. After reviewing the facts, the Utah Supreme Court stated as follows: 
|T]he raised highway . . . was not built in any part on the condemned 
portion of Arby's land. Rather, the condemned land was used for the 
construction of a small portion of the frontage road. The frontage road 
itself causes no damage to the view from Arby's remaining land. However, 
. . . the land was condemned as part of UDOT's plan to raise the highway 
and was therefore condemned as part of a single project. 
Whether severance damages are awardable hinges on whether the severance 
of the condemned property, and the use of that property, caused damage to 
the remaining property. Utah Code section 78-34-10(2) describes 
severance damages as those damages "which will accrue to the portion [of 
property] not sought to be condemned by reason of its severance from the 
portion sought to be condemned and the construction of the improvement in 
the manner proposed by the plaintiff." This section has no express 
requirement that the view-impairing structure be built directly on the 
condemned land. Rather, it only requires that the severance damages be 
caused by the condemnation of. and use of. the property. 
Id. at ^} 17-18 (emphasis added). 
Based upon these principles, the Supreme Court made the following ruling: 
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When land is condemned as part of a single project-even if the view-
impairing structure itself is built on property other than that which was 
condemned-if the use of the condemned property is essential to the 
completion of the project as a whole, the property owner is entitled to 
severance damages. Logically, if the project could not be built without 
taking the condemned land, the impairment of view caused by the 
completion of the project could and would not have arisen "but for" the 
condemnation. This is the very essence of cause. 
Id. at T| 21 (emphasis added). 
The key facts noted by the Utah Supreme Court in the Ivers case are for all 
essential purposes identical to the facts in the present case: 
1. Both cases involved the taking of property that was an essential part of the 
overall project.2 
2. In both cases, the elevated roadway blocked the view from the remaining 
property. 
3. In neither case was the \ iew offending structure constructed on the land 
taken. 
4. In both cases, the property taken was used by UDOT to construct an access 
road and other improvements related to the project that separated the damaged remainder 
property from the project improvements. 
5. The remaining property abuts the property taken to relocate the access road 
and a large storm drain. 
These facts satisfy the Supreme Court's ultimate holding in Ivers that: 
~It is undisputed that the taking of Admiral's property was necessan and essential 
for the 1-15 project. This can be shown through UDOT's own condemnation documents. 
(R. 673. 678-684). 
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With respect to lost view, severance damages are appropriate under Utah 
Code section 78-34-10 where a portion of property is condemned by the 
state and the condemnation of that land causes damage to the 
noncondemned portion of land. Damage to the noncondemned portion of 
land is "caused" by the severance . . . when the view-impairing structure is 
built on land other than the condemned land, but the condemned land is 
used as part of a single project and that use is essential to completion of the 
project. 
Id. at Tf 26 (emphasis added). That is exactly what has occurred in this case. 
Despite the obvious similarities between the Ivers case and the present case, the 
Court of Appeals summarily dismissed the Ivers decision as distinguishable. Moreover, 
the decision of the Court of Appeals to exclude evidence of severance damages based on 
loss of view fails to note that the facts of the present case comply fully with all of the 
requirements of the Ivers decision and of Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-511(2).3 
The case of Utah State Road Commission v. Miya, 526 P.2d 926 (Utah 1974), 
cited in passing by the Court of Appeals, is not on point. The offending structure in that 
case was in fact erected "within the existing right-of-way." 
The Court there noted: 
The rights of access, light, and air are easements appurtenant to the land of 
an abutting owner on a street; they constitute property rights forming part 
of the owner's estate. These substantial property rights, although subject to 
reasonable regulation, may not be taken away without just compensation. 
3Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-511(2) provides: 
(2) if the property sought to be condemned constitutes only a part of a 
larger parcel, the damages which will accrue to the portion not sought to be 
condemned by reason of its severance from the portion sought to be condemned 
and the construction of the improvement in the manner proposed by the plaintiff; 
13 
One of the rights appurtenant to abutting property is that of receiving light 
and air from the highway and an abutting owner is entitled to compensation 
for infringement of his right to light and air by a structure in the highway, 
even if it is a proper highway use. 
* * # 
An owner of land abutting on a street is also in possession of an easement 
of view, which constitutes a property right which may not be taken without 
just compensation. 
As can be noted in the quoted excerpts, the Court's decision did not preclude 
claims for severance damages where, as here, the offending structure in fact caused 
substantial damage to the remainder that abuts the land taken as an "essential part of the 
project" for relocation of the access road and a large storm drain. Nor does the Court 
there indicate that the abutting "street" or "highway" must be owned by the Department 
of Highways.4 
In summary, the Court of Appeals failed to recognize the factual similarities 
between this case and the Ivers case. Additionally, the decision of the Court of Appeals 
does not deal with the clear violation of the constitutional requirement that just 
compensation be paid for the taking of substantial property rights, but instead simply opts 
for "the ease of application and the predictability engendered by a brite-line rule [which] 
are of such obvious benefit in this area of the law. . . ." 
4
 Also not on point is the case of State v. Har\>ey Real Estate, 2002 UT 107. 57 P.3d 
1088, which was simply cited but not discussed by the Court of Appeals. That case 
involved (1) a claim for closure of an intersection and (2) abandonment by UDOT but no 
claim for loss of view or visibility. See id. 
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POINT III 
The decision to exclude evidence of severance damages based on loss of 
view will allow UDOT to reap a windfall at Admiral's expense. 
As noted above, the so-called "brite-line rule" adopted by the Court of Appeals 
would permit the UDOT to appropriate a substantial portion of the property value 
belonging to Admiral. The decision to eliminate the value of view from the property 
from fair market value provides a very significant windfall in the amount of that value to 
UDOT at Admiral's expense because that value was specifically included in the price 
Admiral paid for Lot 17 just two years previously, and for Lot 16 at the same time of the 
take. 
Admiral's expert, Jerry Webber, made three separate appraisals of the properties 
in question. The first appraisal, concerning the fair market value of Lot 16 and Lot 17, 
was dated November 25, 1994. Admiral purchased Lot 17 in March of 1995, based upon 
the fair market value as reflected in that appraisal. Mr. Webber made a second appraisal 
that concerned the fair market value of Lot 16 in October of 1997. Admiral purchased 
Lot 16 in July of 1998, based upon the fair market value as reflected in that appraisal. 
The harshness of the trial court's ruling is demonstrated by Admiral's purchase of 
the property for its appraised fair market value, which clearly included both the value of 
view and visibility, only to have UDOT take the property without paying any 
compensation for view or visibility. Thus, the substantial value representing both view 
and visibility are automatically shifted from Admiral to UDOT without a single dollar 
being paid as compensation. This violates the constitutional mandate that property not be 
15 
taken without payment of just compensation. See Utah Const. Ait. I, § 22; Southern Pac. 
Co, v. Arthur, 352 P.2d 693, 695 (Utah 1960) ("The standard of what is 'just 
compensation' in the ordinary case is the market value of the property taken, that is what 
a willing buyer would pay to a willing seller.'5). 
There is no justifiable reason why UDOT, unlike anyone else, should be permitted 
to acquire valuable property rights without paying just compensation. 
POINT IV 
It is impossible to segregate loss of view damages from Admiral's 
overall severance damage amount. 
In preparing his appraisal report, Mr. Webber determined Admiral's severance 
damages to the remainder, based upon all of the factors that a prudent and willing buyer 
and seller, with knowledge of the facts, would take into account in arriving at fair market 
value, including but not limited to, view and visibility. Mr. Webber was unable despite 
extensive study and effort to identify comparable sales that did not take into account both 
view from the property and visibility of the property from 1-15. (R. at R772-75.) View 
and visibility are critical factors that affect any piece of property along the 1-15 corridor. 
Any property located adjacent to 1-15 will have a combination of both such values and it 
is impossible to allocate and assign a separate value to each. Licensed appraisers cannot 
speculate as to such values, which can vary widely from one property to another, and 
cannot be justified with true comparables generally used and accepted in appraisal 
practices. As a result, it is impossible to segregate out loss of view damages from 
Admiral5s overall severance damage amount. 
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Moreover, the trial court's Minute Entry and the Court of Appeals' Memorandum 
Decision are both directly contrary to the Utah Supreme Court's decision in State Road 
Comm 'n v. Rohan, 487 P.2d 857 (Utah 1971. In Rohan, the State Road Commission took 
a position similar to the position espoused by UDOT in this case. The State argued that it 
was improper to permit the defendants' expert to take into consideration and testify 
concerning diminution in value resulting from increased noise from the highway. The 
Utah Supreme Court rejected the State's position and held that the testimony of the expert 
who considered the increase in noise was properly allowed, notwithstanding the fact that 
it would have been improper to segregate and evaluate noise as a separate item of 
damage. The Rohan court held that 
there should not be any attempt to isolate and appraise as a separate item of 
damage any loss of value due to noise or any other such intangible factor; 
and this is true even where there has been an actual taking of property. Any 
such attempt to so segregate and place a separate money value on the effect 
the factor of noise would have upon property would inevitably involve the 
uncertainty and impracticability above referred to in this decision. This 
should not be done either for the purpose of making an award of a separate 
item of damage, as was dealt with in the Williams case, nor for the purpose 
of fixing a separate amount to be deducted from the severance damage to 
the remaining property as plaintiff contends here. 
On the other hand, in order to correctly evaluate the severance damages, 
i.e., the damage to the remaining property, it is obvious that it should be 
viewed in the composite as it will be after the taking and after the 
improvement has been constructed. In making the appraisal it is not only 
permissible but necessary to consider all of the facts and circumstances that 
a prudent and willing buyer and seller, with knowledge of the facts, would 
take into account in arriving at its market value. The testimony of the 
defendant's expert which is here under attack indicates that he conformed 
to that formula. He properly and candidly included the facts that the new 
freeway adjacent to the property, with the attendant increase in traffic and 
noises, were among the factors considered in making his appraisal. But 
there was no attempt to segregate and place a separate money value 
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thereon. We think the trial court was well advised in admitting his 
testimony and that no prejudicial error was committed. 
Id. at 859 (emphasis added). 
The same is true in this case. Mr. Webber properly considered loss of view as one 
of many factors that reduce the market value of Admiral's remaining property. The 
decrease in value resulting from loss of view cannot be segregated out and assigned a 
separate money value in assessing the total mix of factors that Mr. Webber considered. 
Mr. Webber stated as much in his affidavit. In fact, it would have been improper for Mr. 
Webber to attempt to segregate out a separate amount related to loss of visibility and 
deduct that amount from the overall severance damages. See Rohan, 487 P.2d at 859 
("This should not be done either for the purpose of making an award of a separate item of 
damage, . . . nor for the puipose of fixing a separate amount to be deducted from the 
severance damage to the remaining property as plaintiff contends here.").15 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, it was error to exclude evidence of Admiral's severance 
damages relating to loss of view from the remaining property. Therefore, the Court 
should reverse the trial court's December 27, 2007 Minute Entry and the Memorandum 
Decision of the Court of Appeals, and remand this matter for further proceedings 
consistent with the Court's ruling herein. 
^Counsel for UDOT was extremely critical of the Utah Supreme Court's decision 
in Rohan, referring to it as an ''embarrassment to the Court." (R. 994 at 48-49.) Despite 
counsel's personal opinion regarding this Court's decision, Rohan has never been 
overturned and remains binding case law. 
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DATED this Oft day of May, 2009. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
tartineau 
D. Jason Hawkins 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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1. Memorandum Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated November 2 8, 2008. 
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ORME, Judge: 
fl In this interlocutory appeal, Admiral Beverage Corporation 
challenges the trial court's granting of three motions in limine. 
The thrust of these rulings was to preclude Admiral from showing, 
as evidence of its severance damages, that the value of its 
remaining property had been diminished due to the loss of view 
and visibility caused by the reconstruction of Interstate 
connection with which some of its property had been taken. 
are based on a court's legal 
decision for correctness. See 
2005 UT App 519, ] 9, 128 P.3d 74, 
2007 UT 19, 154 P.3d 802. 
as here, motions in limine 
conclusions, we review the 
Pep't of Transp. v. Ivers, 
15, in 
When, 
f 
Utah 
aff'd in part and remanded, 
%2 Admiral owns two adjacent lots west of 1-15 in Salt Lake 
County. The property does not actually abut 1-15 but rather 
abuts the west side of 500 West, a surface street that acts as a 
frontage road in the area. In other words, 500 West runs between 
Admiral's property and 1-15, As indicated, UDOT had condemned a 
portion of Admiral's property as part of the massive 1-15 
reconstruction project, although the property taken was used to 
widen 500 West, which the remaining property abuts, rather than 
1-15, which it does not. 
J^3 Admiral relies too heavily on Ivers v. Utah Department of 
Transportation, 2007 UT 19, 154 P.3d 802, for its contention that 
severance damages for loss of view are warranted in this case. 
See id. f 26. While Ivers indicated that severance damages may 
have been appropriate in that case, pending resolution of a 
factual issue, see id., the case included an important fact that 
is not present here--the landowner's property in Ivers abutted 
the state road whose reconstruction was alleged to have caused 
the loss of view. See id. ^ 2-4. And from our review of Utah 
case law, it seems clear that the settled rule is that the 
landowner's remaining property must actually abut the property 
with the view-impairing structure.1 See Utah State Rd. Comm'n v. 
Miya, 526 P.2d 926, 928 (Utah 1974) ("The rights of access, 
light, and air are easements appurtenant to the land of an 
abutting owner on a street; they constitute property rights 
forming part of the owner's estate."). Accord Ivers, 2007 UT 19, 
1^ 13 (quoting Miya for the same point) ; State v. Harvey Real 
Estate, 2002 UT 107, ^ 13, 57 P.3d 1088 (quoting Miya for the 
same point and stating that "in order to recover for such a 
taking, an owner must show that 'the structure violates some 
right appurtenant to the abutting property or otherwise inflicts 
some special and peculiar injury'") (citation omitted). 
1. We note that Ivers v. Utah Department of Transportation, 2007 
UT 19, 154 P.3d 802, dealt with a different issue in its analysis 
of whether severance damages were appropriate for loss of view, 
i.e., whether a landowner is entitled to severance damages when 
the view impairing structure is not built on the condemned 
portion of the land, see id. ^ 1, and held: 
With respect to lost view, severance damages 
are appropriate under Utah Code section 78-
34-10 where a portion of property is 
condemned by the state and the condemnation 
of that land causes damage to the 
noncondemned portion of land. Damage to the 
noncondemned portion of land is "caused" by 
the severance in two situations: (1) when 
the view-impairing structure is built on the 
condemned land, or (2) when the view-
impairing structure is built on land other 
than the condemned land, but the condemned 
land is used as part of a single project and 
that use is essential to completion of the 
project. 
Id. |^ 26 (emphasis in original) . We do not, however, interpret 
Ivers as eliminating the abutment rule. 
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Admiral's remaining property does not abut 1-15, the elevation of 
which impedes the view from Admiral's property; rather, it abuts 
500 West. 
1|4 We acknowledge that application of the abutment rule in this 
case may seem harsh, given that Admiral's proximity to the now-
elevated 1-15 is very close and that its property abuts land 
taken for the overall project. Still, the ease of application 
and the predictability engendered by a bright-line rule are of 
such obvious benefit in this area of the law that if the abutment 
rule is to be moderated, it must come at the direction of our 
Supreme Court rather than of this court. 
15 Affirmed.' 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
H6 I CONCUR: 
^ ^ * — 
James/Jf. Davis, ^ftiaqe 
f7 I CONCUR IN THE RESULT: 
\£&i*J 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
2. Insofar as Admiral still seeks to admit evidence addressing 
the reduced visibility of its property to motorists traveling the 
nearby highways, its argument is definitively foreclosed by 
Ivers. See 2007 UT 19, \ \ 12-15. 
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
A D M I R A L B E V E R A G E 
CORPORATION (Assignee of Mark 
Investment Trust), PARK CITY WEST 
& ASSOCIATES, VALLEY BANK & 
TRUST COMPANY nka BANK ONE, 
UTAH; and VALLEY MORTGAGE 
COMPANY nka UTAH INVESTMENT 
COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
A D M I R A L B E V E R A G E 
CORPORATION, 
Defendant. 
Plaintiff Utah Department of Transportation ('"UDOT'") filed a Motion in Limine to which 
defendant Admiral Beverage Corporation ('"Admiral") responded with a cross-motion, Motion in 
Limine of Defendant Admiral Beverage Corporation to Admit Evidence of Ail Factors That Affect 
Fair Market Value ("Admiral's Motion m Limine"'). While both motions are nominall} focused on 
MEMORANDUM DECISION and 
ORDER (Cross-Motions m Limine) 
CONSOLIDATED: 
Case No. 970905361 CD 
Case No. 970905368CD 
Judge Stephen L. Roth 
the parties* competing views of the admissibility of basically the same evidence, they recognize that 
the real issue is the scope of severance damages that may be awarded to defendants under Utah 
condemnation law. The parties submitted memoranda supporting their own motions and opposing 
their opponents, as well as reply memoranda. The court heard argument on the motions on June 28, 
2005, where UDOT was represented by Randy S. Hunter, Assistant Attorney General, and Admiral 
was represented by Rex E. Madsen (who argued) and Reed L. Martineau, Snow Christensen & 
Martineau. The court gave leave to Admiral to submit a new survey in response to one submitted 
by UDOT just before the hearing. That survey was provided to the court on August 31, 2005, and 
the matter was submitted for decision. Having considered the memoranda, affidavits and other 
evidence submitted, along with the arguments of counsel, the court GRANTS UDOTs Motion in 
Limine and DENIES Admiral's Motion in Limine, for the reasons set forth below. 
DECISION 
A. Factual Background, 
The relevant facts do not appear to be disputed in any material way. Admiral owns two 
adjacent lots directly to the west of the 1-15 freeway, bordering 500 West, which serves as a frontage 
road in that area, running north and south between the Admiral lots and the west side of the freeway. 
In connection with the 1-15 reconstruction project, the west side of the freeway in that area vsas 
moved closer to the Admiral lots, requiring that the 500 West frontage road also be moved further 
to the west and onto the east side of Admiral's property, resulting in the condemnation of what are 
now identified by UDOT as parcels 109 and 110, which are the subject of these consolidated cases. 
-? . 
Before reconstruction, the existing freeway lanes had an elevation about two feet higher than 
the surface of Admiral's property. The reconstructed freeway is elevated considerably higher, with 
a portion of the freeway wall reaching a height of about 28 feet at a point about six inches outside 
and to the west of the southeast corner of parcel 109, the former southeast corner of the Admiral 
property, and about 62 feet from the nearest point of Admiral's property remaining after the 
condemnation.1 While 500 West was reconstructed on the taken parcels, no part of the rebuilt 
freeway itself is located on that property. 
Based on an appraisal, UDOT deposited into court a total of $163,100 as payment of just 
condemnation for the taking of parcels 109 and 110. Admiral appears to have only minimal 
disagreement that the deposited amount is a fair value for the property taken, as valued on a square-
footage basis. The central issue is whether there are additional compensable severance damages to 
the remainder of Admiral's property. Based on the reports of its own expert appraisal witnesses. 
Admiral claims that the market value of the remaining property has been reduced by "(a) loss of air, 
light, view, visibility and aesthetics, and (b) increased fumes and dust from traffic traveling on the 
reconstructed 1-15 freeway . . . . " Admiral's Memorandum in Support of its Motion in Limine to 
Admit Evidence of All Factors That Affect Fair Market Value and in Opposition to Plaintiffs 
1
 Admiral originally argued that a portion of the freeway wall at issue was actually built 
within the southeast corner of parcel 109, based on UDOT engineering drawings that appeared to 
support such a conclusion. About two weeks before the hearing, however, UDOT submitted, 
through the Affidavit of Keith Hafen, a more detailed survey that showed the wall, at its nearest 
point, to be six inches outside of the condemned parcel 109. Subsequent to the hearing, Admiral had 
its own survey done, which confirmed that the wall was outside of parcel 109, although four to five 
inches at its closest point rather than six, a difference that is not material to the issues before the 
court. 
Motion m Limine (' Admiral's Memorandum m Support") at 2 UDOT contends that these rights 
are not compensable as severance damages under applicable law 
B. Analysis 
The factors identified by Admiral's appraisers as damaging the remaining piopert} seem to 
fall into three categories the loss of visibility and prominence of the remainder due to the size and 
location of the new freeway structuies, loss of air and light to, and view from, the lemainmg 
property, and the increase m noise, dust, fumes and so on from increased traffic flow nearer to the 
remainder than the prior freeway The claim for loss of visibility is the only subject addressed in 
UDOT's Motion m Limine, but all of these factors are addressed in Admiral's Motion in Limine, 
which is imposed in toto by UDOT The loss of visibility issue is addressed separately as a matter 
of first impiession in Utah 
I. Loss of Visibility 
There seems to be no dispute that reconstruction of the portion of I-15 passing by the Admiral 
pioperty, which moved the freeway closer and significantly raised its giade, restricts the visibility 
of the remainder parcels from passing vehicles m comparison with the prior freeway configuration 
The isbiie of whether reduced visibility is a compensable severance damage has not been directly 
addressed by Utah appellate courts Nevertheless, the court believes that analogous Utah case law 
provides guidance m this area 
A long line of Utah cases has established the principle that the appurtenant rights of an owner 
of abutting property do not include an interest in the traffic flow from a public road or highway 
passing b> his property that justifies severance damages if reduced or taken awa> In Hampton \ 
State Road Commission, 445 P 2d 708 (Utah 1968), the court noted that "the right of ingress or 
-4. 
egress to or from one's property [does not] include any right in and to existing public traffic on the 
highway, or any right to have such traffic pass by one's abutting property." Id. at 711. The court 
explained: 
The reason is that all traffic on public highways is controlled by the police power of 
the State, and what the police power may give an abutting property owner in the way 
of traffic on the highway it may take away, and by any such diversion of traffic the 
State and any of its agencies are not liable for any decrease of property values by 
reason of such diversion of traffic, because such damages are ^damnum absque 
injuria? or damage without legal injury. 
Id. at 347. See also, Weber Basin Water Conservancy District v Hislop, 362 P.2d 580, 581 (Utah 
1961) (uThe owner of land abutting on a street or highway has no property or other vested right in 
the flow of traffic on that street or highway and is not entitled to compensation when that flow of 
traffic is diminished as a result of eminent domain proceedings"); Utah State Road Commission v. 
Miya, 526 P.2d 926,928 (Utah 1974) ("A property owner has no right to a free and unrestricted flow 
of traffic past his premises, and any impairment or interference with this flow does not entitle the 
owner to compensation."); Utah Department of Transportation v. Harvey Real Estate, 2002 UT 107, 
\\A (citing Miya and quoting Hampton for the principle stated above). 
Here, a significant portion of Admiral's claimed severance is based on the reduction in 
visibility from the reconstructed freeway when compared to its original configuration. The visibility 
that was lost, under these circumstances, was necessarily a function of the passage of traffic. In other 
words, the original visibility of the site resulted from the construction of the freeway by the State, 
which exposed the Admiral property to the view of passing motorists who used the freeway as a 
route of travel Under existing law, if the State had moved the freeway route horizontally, to a 
different location far enough from the Admiral property that it traffic no longer passed by it, the 
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deprivation of the passing traffic itself would not be a compensable injury. It is difficult to see how 
moving the freeway vertically, so that traffic continues to pass by the property but without being able 
to see it, results in an injury that is any different as a practical matter or that is legally distinctive in 
any meaningful way. The court therefore does not believe that diminishment of visibility from a 
road or highway is any more compensable as severance damages than a more general diversion of 
traffic flow would be. 
Moreover, even if a right to visibility were found to be appurtenant to landowners abutting 
a highway or road, the rights of abutting owners with respect to a freeway are significantly more 
limited. 1-15 is a "[l]imited-access facility," which is defined by statute as "a highway especially 
designated for through traffic, and over, from, or to which neither owners nor occupants of abutting 
lands nor any other persons have any right or easement, or have only a limited right or easement of 
access, light, air, or view." U.C.A. § 72-1-102 (11). This definition suggests, among other things, 
an intent to restrict the appurtenant rights of lands abutting freeways so as to limit the scope of 
severance damages attributable to such rights. 
Admiral relies in part on People v. Ricardi, 144 P.2d 799 (Cal. 1944), and subsequent 
decisions following it, for the proposition that a landowner is entitled to severance damages for the 
loss of the view of his property from a highway. The California Court of Appeals, however, 
subsequently held that Ricardi 's "right to a view" does not apply to freewa> s The court upheld the 
lower court's conclusion that an owner "has no legal right to a view of his property from the 
freeway:" 
A freeway is unlike a highway. An abutter/landowner has a right to a view from a 
public road or highway. However, while the purpose of a highway is to provide 
landowners with abutter's rights, the purpose of a freeway is to eliminate those rights. 
-6-
People ex rel Department of Transportation v, Wilson, 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 52, 55 (Cal.App. 3 994) 
(citation to Ricardi omitted). The court noted that the purpose of roads or highways is to allow 
access from abutting private property and to allow travelers along the road or highway 4*to view a 
business, drive into it, patronize it, and reenter the highway" but that "[s]uch purposes are 
antagonistic to the purpose of a freeway," which is designed to '"prevent just that sort of thing.'" 
Id (citations omitted). The court went on to discuss a California statute similar in import to Utah's: 
For that reason. Streets and Highway Code section 23.5 provides that owners of 
abutting lands to a freeway have limited or no right of access to or from their abutting 
lands. Obviously a freeway restricts rights of access and related rights such as the 
right to a view. 
Id 
Therefore, even if the court were inclined to find a right to a view of one's abutting property 
from a road or highway under Utah law, the court concludes that a landowner "has no legal right to 
a view of his property from the freeway." 
2. Other Damages. 
Admiral also claims it is entitled to severance damages for "loss of air, light, view, visibility 
and aesthetics," a bundle of rights that may include, but goes beyond, the right to a view from the 
freeway, as well as for "increased fumes and dust from traffic traveling on the reconstructed 1-15 
freeway." The court concludes that Utah law does not allow recovery for such damages under the 
circumstances of these consolidated cases. 
The claimed damages appear to arise either from the elevation of the grade of the freeway 
or from increased traffic due to the freewa\ improvements. Neither the construction of the elevated 
ramp or the reconstruction of the freeway itself, however, occurred on Admiral's property; the only 
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improvement constructed on Admiral's property was the relocation of the 500 West frontage road. 
Utah cases have been consistent in holding that severance damages are limited to those caused by 
the taking itself or attributable to improvements constructed on the taken property. The court in 
Miya7 in finding compensable the loss of view from a remainder properly caused by construction of 
a highway highway structure, noted that "the loss of view occasioned by a proposed public structure 
to be erected, in part at least, upon a parcel of property taken by condemnation from a unit" was a 
factor to be taken into account in determining severance damages. Miya, 526 P.2d at 929 (emphasis 
added). 
This precept was emphasized in Utah Dep Y of Transportation v. D Ambrosio, 743 P.2d 1220 
(Utah 1987), where the state took a private road to two residences, which it paved and made public 
in connection with a highway extension. The Court rejected the landowners' claim that they were 
entitled to severance damages from construction of the highway: 
The general rule is that damages attributable to the taking of others' property and the 
construction of improvements thereon are not compensable. Such damages suffered 
generally by all the property owners in the area are deemed consequential. 
Severance damages are those caused by the taking of a portion of the parcel of 
property where the taking or the construction of the improvement on that part causes 
injury to that portion of the parcel not taken. 
Id at 1221-22 (emphasis in the original). 
The court reernphasized its D 'Ambrosio holding in Harvey Real Estate, supra, an appeal of 
a trial court's grant of the state's motion in limine excluding certain severance damage evidence. 
In Harvey, the landowner sought severance damages for the diminution in value of its remainder 
property resulting from the closure of an intersection as part of a road project for which a portion of 
its land was taken. Similar to an argument Admiral makes here, the owner contended that the 
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intersection closure "was made possible only by the taking of Harvey's property — " Harvey, 2002 
UT 107, TJ12. Harvey asserted that limiting severance damages to only those resulting from 
improvements constructed at least in part on the portion of the property taken conflicted with the 
broad language of U.C.A. § 78-34-10(2), which provides for assessment of damages to a remainder 
from the taking of a portion of the property and from wCthe construction of the improvement in the 
manner proposed by the plaintiff [condemning authority]." The court disagreed: 
Section 78-34-10 gives a landowner the right to present evidence of damages caused 
by the construction of the improvement made on the severed property. It does not 
given the landowner the right to present evidence of damages caused by other facets 
of the construction project. 
We held essentially the same in Utah Department of Transportation v. D 'Ambrosio, 
743 P.2d 1220,1222 (Utah 1987), although we did not reference section 78-34-10(2). 
There we stated that "severance damages are those caused by the taking of a portion 
of the parcel of property where the taking or the construction of the improvement on 
that part causes injury to that portion of the property not taken." (Emphasis added.) 
Our holding today also accords with the well-established common law principle that 
severance damages umay be made for any diminution in the value of [an owner's 
non-condemned land], as long as those damages were directly caused by the taking 
itself and by the condemnor's use of the land taken." 26 Am Jur. 2d Eminent Domain 
§ 368 (1996) (emphasis added) . . . . 
Id at ^ 10-11 (interpolations and emphasis in the original, some citations omitted). 
The court therefore concludes that damages resulting from construction of the elevated ramp 
just outside the taken parcels, as well as damages from the reconfiguration of the freeway as part of 
the reconstruction project are not compensable as severance damages under Utah law. This appears 
to include evidence related to all of'the components of severance damages" that were "'taken into 
account" by Admiral's expert appraisers and enumerated at paragraph 7 of the Affidavit of Robert 
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A. Steele and paragraph 7 of the Affidavit of John C Brown (Exhibits A and B? respectively, to 
Admiral's Memorandum in Support), except for 'loss of parking."2 
ORDER 
It is therefore ORDERED that UDOT's Motion in Limine is GRANTED, and Admiral's 
Motion in Limine to Admit Evidence of All Factors That Affect Fair Market Value is DENIED. 
DATED this S/ day of October, 2005. 
BY THE COURT: 
Stephen L. Roth 
DISTRICT JUDGE ft 
** 
2
 The facts of this case illustrate the sometimes arbitrary nature of the rule that the court has 
relied on in making its decision here. Without so finding, it is certainly possible that the court's 
decision would have been significantly different if the offending elevated freeway ramp had been 
built six inches within, rather than six inches outside, the condemned parcel 109. In this regard 
Admiral has advanced an argument that has special appeal given the harsh result the difference of 
a matter of inches may produce. That argument proposes that if a taking is part of an integrated 
project (which Admiral argues is the case here), the landowner should be entitled to compensation 
for damages resulting from specific improvements related to the purpose of the taking and causing 
specific injury to the remainder, even if they were not constructed within the immediate boundaries 
of the take See Admiral Beverage Corporation's Reply Memorandum in Support of Its Motion in 
Limine . . ., at 6-10. This approach recognizes that the actual reduction in value of the remainder 
from the improvement, as a practical matter, may be no different when it is located just within or just 
outside of the taken parcel. 
The court believes, however, that the repeated (and apparently unequivocal) holdings of the 
Utah Supreme Court, as addressed above, constrain it from seriously considering such an approach 
at this level, because it would involve a departure from current law. In this regard, the appellate 
courts are better equipped to identify, analyze and resolve the competing public and private interests, 
as well as the legal complications, that would be implicated in such a change in approach to 
severance damages. The resolution of these issues must therefore be left to some future appeal 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 
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vs. 
ADMIRAL BEVERAGE CORPORATION 
(ASSIGNEE OF MARK INVESTMENT 
COMPANY) ; PARK CITY WEST & 
ASSOCIATES; VALLEY BANK & TRUST 
COMPANY, nka BANK ONE, UTAH; 
VALLEY MORTGAGE COMPANY, nka 
UTAH INVESTMENT COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 
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vs. 
ADMIRAL BEVERAGE CORPORATION, 
Defendant. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NO. 970905361 
970905368 
(Consolidated) 
UDOT's Motions in Limine on the issue of view and visibility and 
concerning Jerry P. Weber's testimony on the subject of severance damages 
caused by loss of view and visibility was heard by the Court on December 
18, 2007, at 10:00 a.m. After hearing arguments thereon, review of the 
pleadings and a specific review of the Decision dated October 31st, 2005 
issued by Judge Roth m this case, che Court grants UDOT's Motions m 
Limine. The Court also refers the parties to Judge Poth's decision and 
adopts the same here. 
Defendant is able to assert claims for any severance damages 
relating to abutment rights pertaining to being an adjoining landowner 
to 500 West. 
This Minute Entry decision will stand as the Order of the Court. 
Dated this 24th day of December, 2007. 
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